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We present a scheme for quantum secure direct communication with quantum encryption. The
two authorized users use repeatedly a sequence of the pure entangled pairs (quantum key) shared
for encrypting and decrypting the secret message carried by the traveling photons directly. For
checking eavesdropping, the two parties perform the single-photon measurements on some decoy
particles before each round. This scheme has the advantage that the pure entangled quantum signal
source is feasible at present and any eavesdropper cannot steal the message.
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Quantum mechanics provides some novel ways for pro-
cessing and transmission of quantum information. Quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) is considered to be the safest
system for creating a private key between two remote au-
thorized users, say Alice and Bob, and may be the most
advanced application of quantum information. The non-
cloning theorem forbids an eavesdropper, Eve to eaves-
drop the quantum communication freely. In 1984, Ben-
nett and Brassard [1] proposed an original QKD protocol
with nonorthogonal polarized single photons. As an un-
known quantum states cannot be eavesdropped without
leaving a trace in the outcomes obtained by the two par-
ties, the BB84 protocol is unconditionally secure [2]. In
1991, Ekert [3] introduced another QKD scheme based
on the correlation of an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
pair, the maximally entangled two-particle state, by us-
ing Bell inequality for error rate analysis. Subsequently,
Bennett, Brassard and Mermin (BBM92) [4] simplified
the process for eavesdropping check in this scheme with
two nonorthogonal measuring bases. Lo, Chau and Arde-
hali [5] presented a QKD model with two nonsymmetric
bases. Huang et al. [6] and Deng et al. [7] designed two
QKD models by using repeatedly a sequence of private
classical bits shared initially for improving their efficiency
for qubits or reducing the delay time in QKD with some
orthogonal states. To date, much attention has been fo-
cused on QKD [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11].
Recently, quantum secure direct communication
(QSDC), a novel concept, was proposed and pursued by
some groups [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29]. Different from QKD whose goal is
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to generate a private key between the two remote parties
of communication, QSDC is used to communicate the se-
cret message directly without generating a key in advance
and then encrypting the message for its transmission in
a classical channel. According to the Deng-Long-Liu cri-
terion [12, 13, 14], on one hand, the sender Alice should
confirm whether the quantum channel is secure before
she encodes the message on the quantum states trans-
mitted as the messages cannot be discarded in QSDC
[12, 13, 14]. Moreover, the message should be read out
by the receiver Bob directly [12, 13, 14]. On the other
hand, the security of quantum communication is based
on the error rate analysis with the theories in statistics
[12, 13, 14]. In this way, the quantum states in QSDC
should be transmitted in a quantum data block, same as
those in Refs. [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. It is not a
necessary condition in QKD as the error rate analysis is
just a postprocessing step, and the results transmitted
do not include the information about the secret message
and can be abandoned [12, 13, 14].
In 2002 Beige et al. [19] proposed a QSDC scheme
with single-photon two-qubit states. In their scheme, one
qubit is used to check the security of the quantum chan-
nel after some results are transmitted, and the other is
used to carry the message. The message can be read out
after a transmission of an additional classical bit for each
qubit [20]. Subsequently Bostro¨m and Felbingeer pro-
posed a quasi-secure QSDC protocol, called Ping-Pong
QSDC protocol [20], with an EPR pair. In this scheme
the eavesdropping done by Eve can be hidden with the
loss of a practical quantum channel [21] and the error
aroused by the noise of the quantum channel [22]. More-
over, the two parties can accomplish the error rate anal-
ysis only after they transmit an enough large set of mes-
sage, and some message may leak to Eve in a noise chan-
nel. The two-step QSDC scheme [12] and the scheme
2with single photons [13] proposed by Deng et al. can be
made secure even in a noisy channel with quantum pri-
vacy amplification [30, 31] as the states are transmitted
in a quantum date block and the confirmation of the se-
curity of the quantum channel has be achieved before the
sender encodes her message on the states. These ideas
are borrowed by Wang et al. [15] to design the QSDC
models as well.
In this paper, we will present a scheme for quantum
secure direct communication with quantum encryption.
This protocol uses a controlled-not (CNot) gate to en-
code and decode the secret message. The two parties
first share privately a sequence of two-photon pure en-
tangled states which are feasible with the present tech-
nologies, and then use the states as their private quantum
key which is reusable with a eavesdropping check before
each round. The receiver can read out directly the mes-
sage and each photon transmitted between the parties
can carry one bit of message securely in principle.
Generally speaking, many QKD and QSDC schemes
choose EPR pairs as quantum information carriers to
transmit a private key or a secret message. The reason
is that the two photons in the four Bell states have good
correlations in both the measuring bases Z = {|0〉, |1〉}
and X = {| ± x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉)}.
|φ+〉AB = 1√
2
(|0〉A|0〉B + |1〉A|1〉B)
=
1√
2
(|+ x〉A|+ x〉B + | − x〉A| − x〉B) (1)
|φ−〉AB = 1√
2
(|0〉A|0〉B − |1〉A|1〉B)
=
1√
2
(|+ x〉A| − x〉B + | − x〉A|+ x〉B) (2)
|ψ+〉AB = 1√
2
(|0〉A|1〉B + |1〉A|0〉B)
=
1√
2
(|+ x〉A|+ x〉B − | − x〉A| − x〉B) (3)
|ψ−〉AB = 1√
2
(|0〉A|1〉B − |1〉A|1〉B)
=
1√
2
(|+ x〉A| − x〉B − | − x〉A|+ x〉B) (4)
This feature is very useful in the eavesdropping check
process. However, it is difficult to produce the maximally
two-particle entangled states with the present technolo-
gies. Contrarily, in experiments the two photons pre-
pared are usually in the pure entangled state, such as
|Ψ〉AB = a|0〉A|0〉B+ b|1〉A|1〉B (|a|2+ |b|2 = 1). The two
photons are always correlated in the basis Z, but not in
the basis X , as
|Ψ〉AB = a|0〉A|0〉B + b|1〉A|1〉B
=
1
2
[(a+ b)(|+ x〉A|+ x〉B + | − x〉A| − x〉B)
+ (a− b)(|+ x〉A| − x〉B + | − x〉A|+ x〉B)].(5)
This means that the security of the quantum communi-
cation with pure entangled states is lower than that with
Bell states if we use the two bases X and Z to check
the security. On the other hand, those pure entangled
quantum sources are more convenient in practical appli-
cations. In this QSDC scheme, we use some decoy pho-
tons to check the eavesdropping for overcoming the flaw
of pure entangled states.
Now, let us describe our QSDC scheme in detail as
follows. It includes four steps.
(S1) The two authorized users (Alice and Bob) share
a sequence of two-particle pure entangled states securely
as their private quantum key.
For this task, Bob first prepares n two-photon pairs
randomly in one of the two pure entangled states |Ψ〉AB
and |Φ〉AB. Here |Φ〉AB = b|0〉A|0〉B + a|1〉A|1〉B which
can be obtained by flipping the bit value of the two pho-
tons in the state |Ψ〉AB; i.e., |Φ〉AB = σAx ⊗ σBx |Ψ〉AB
(here σx is a Pauli operator). Bob picks up photon B in
each pair for forming the sequence SB : [B1, B2, · · · , Bn].
The other sequence SA is made up of particles Ai(i =
1, 2...n). He keeps the sequence SB at home and sends
the sequence SA to Alice. For checking eavesdropping,
Bob inserts some decoy photons Sde, which are randomly
in one of the four states {|0〉, |1〉, |+x〉, |−x〉}, into the se-
quence SA. He can get a decoy photon by measuring one
photon in a two-photon pair |Ψ〉AB with the basis Z and
operating on the other photon with σx or a Hadamard
(H) operation. In a word, it is unnecessary for the users
to have an ideal single-photon source in this scheme.
After Alice announces the the receipt of the sequence
SA, Bob tells her the positions and the states of the de-
coy photons. Alice measures the decoy photons with the
suitable bases and analyzes the error rate of those out-
comes with Bob. If the error rate is very low, they can
obtain a sequence of quantum key privately and continue
to the next step; otherwise, they discard the transmission
and repeat quantum communication from the beginning.
(S2) Alice and Bob use their private quantum key to
encrypt and decrypt the secret message directly.
For QSDC, Alice prepares a sequence of traveling par-
ticles γi which are in one of the two states {|0〉, |1〉} ac-
cording to the bit value of her secret message is 0 or
1, respectively. We call it the traveling particle sequence
ST . For checking eavesdropping, similar to Refs. [12, 13],
Alice needs to add a small trick in the sequence ST be-
fore she sends it to the quantum channel. That is, he
inserts some decoy photons, say SD which are randomly
in the four states {|0〉, |1〉, |+ x〉, | − x〉} and distributed
randomly in the sequence ST . Alice uses the quantum
key, the pure entangled pairs shared {|Ψ〉AB, |Φ〉AB} to
encrypt the traveling particles in the sequence ST except
for the decoy photons. That is, Alice performs a CNot
operation on the particles Ai and γi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) by
using the particle Ai as the control qubit. Then Alice
sends all the traveling particles to Bob.
After receiving the sequence ST , Bob asks Alice to tell
him the positions and the states of the decoy photons in
3the sequence ST , and then measures them with the same
bases as those Alice chose for preparing them. For the
particles Bi and γi, Bob takes a CNot operation on them
with the particle Bi as the control qubit, similar to Alice,
and then he measures the particles γi with the basis Z
and records the outcomes of the measurements.
(S3) Alice and Bob check the security of their transmis-
sion. They analyze the error rate of the decoy photons.
If the error rate is very low, Bob can trust this transmis-
sion, and read out the message directly. Otherwise they
have to abandon the results and repeat the procedures
from the beginning.
(S4) If the quantum communication succeeds, Alice
and Bob repeat their communication from step 2. That
is, they use repeatedly the pure entangled pairs as their
quantum key and transmit the secret message again in
the next round.
In an ideal condition, this QSDC scheme is secure for
any intercepting-resending attack strategies if the quan-
tum key is private because it is equivalent to a quantum
one-time-pad crypto-system [8, 13]. The encryption on
a traveling particle γi with a CNot operation makes it
entangle with a quantum system in the quantum key.
For an eavesdropper, any quantum system in the quan-
tum key is randomly in one of the two states {|Ψ〉AB =
a|0〉A|0〉B + b|1〉A|1〉B, |Φ〉AB = b|0〉A|0〉B + a|1〉A|1〉B}.
After the CNot operation done by Alice, the three par-
ticles Ai, Bi, and γi are in the GHZ-class state |Ψ〉s1 =
a|00γi〉+b|11γi〉)AiBiγi or |Φ〉s1 = b|00γi〉+a|11γi〉)AiBiγi
randomly. The reduced density matrix of the traveling
particle γi is ργi =
1
2
(
1 0
0 1
)
. That is, the traveling par-
ticle is in one of the two eigenvectors of any measuring
operator with the same probability 50% for any eaves-
dropper, and none can get a useful information about
the state of the traveling particle γi as the effect of his
eavesdropping on the traveling particle is as same as that
by guessing its outcome randomly.
If Eve wants to steal the message carried by the trav-
eling particles, she should eavesdrop the quantum key by
capturing the traveling particles first, and then steal the
information of the traveling particles transmitted in the
next round. However, her action will leave a track in the
eavesdropping check. The reason is that the procedure
of checking eavesdropping done by the two authorized
users in this scheme, in essence, is the same as that in
the BB84 QKD protocol [1] for any eavesdropper. That
is, the decoy photons are produced by choosing randomly
one of the two bases Z and X , and are inserted into the
traveling sequence ST randomly. Also, Bob measures
them with the same bases as those chosen by Alice af-
ter he receives the traveling sequence and obtains the
information about their bases of the decoy photons. For
any eavesdropper, the bases chosen by Bob are random
even though they are announced in public finally as no
eavesdropper has the access to the traveling particles af-
ter Bob receives them. Any eavesdropping will inevitably
disturb the states of the decoy photons and be detected
by the two authorized users if an eavesdropper monitors
the quantum line, same as that in the BB84 protocol [1].
In a practical channel, noises will affect the entangle-
ment of the quantum key. In this time, the users should
exploit entanglement purification [32] to keep the en-
tanglement in the quantum key, and do quantum pri-
vacy amplification [30] on them as well. However, the
two users need not to purify their states to Bell states,
just the pure entangled states |Ψ〉AB = a|0〉A|0〉B +
b|1〉A|1〉B (|Φ〉AB = b|0〉A|0〉B + a|1〉A|1〉B) or |Ψ′〉AB =
a′|0〉A|0〉B+b′|1〉A|1〉B (|Φ′〉AB = b′|0〉A|0〉B+a′|1〉A|1〉B)
in this scheme. Here |a′|2+|b′|2 = 1. As the quantum key
is just used to encrypt and decrypt the secret message,
it is unnecessary for the users to keep the same states as
those they used in last time, just the correlation of each
pair, which will increase the efficiency of the entangle-
ment purification process largely. Certainly, on the one
hand, the users should do error correction on their results
in practical applications, same as the two-step protocol
[12]. On the other hand, this QSDC scheme can only used
to distribute a private key if the loss of the quantum line
is unreasonably large.
In summary, quantum secure direct communication
can be done with quantum encryption by means that
the two authorized users first share privately a sequence
of pure entangled pairs and use them repeatedly as the
quantum key for encrypting the traveling particles which
are in the eigenvectors of the basis Z. The receiver can
read out the message directly and each particle can carry
one bit of the message securely. For checking eavesdrop-
ping, the sender adds a small trick in the traveling par-
ticles which can forbid Eve to eavesdrop the quantum
channel freely. The most important advantage of this
protocol is that the pure entangled quantum signal source
is feasible at present. As the photons used for security
checking is not the quantum key shared, the quantum
key is reusable without abatement in principle.
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